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Foreword
This paper is intended to support informed debate among non-experts on the 
reform of international corporate taxation. It has been produced with the input 
of a diverse group of individuals representing governments, corporations, civil 
society organizations and academia.
Digitalization enables companies to interact with users and the economy of a 
country without establishing a physical presence there. Unique, intangible assets 
make it difficult to apply the arm’s length principle in determining how to value 
transactions between related entities in different countries. Tax competition 
among countries and remaining opportunities for profit shifting to low tax 
jurisdictions have raised concerns. 
Considering these developments, 135 countries are discussing new rules  
under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Inclusive Framework:
1.   To reflect the ability of businesses to create value in a jurisdiction without 
physical presence there, by reallocating taxing rights among countries (Pillar 1)
2.   To tackle tax competition and remaining tax avoidance concerns through a 
global minimum tax (Pillar 2).
Important details are yet to be hammered out: which activities and what portion 
of profits will be subject to the new taxing right, the global minimum tax rate and 
any carve-outs. 
Further analysis on how proposals will affect different economies, tax 
administrations, taxpayers and individuals is needed for informed, inclusive 
agreement. Clearly, for government revenues to be most beneficial, spending 
needs to be allocated and delivered responsibly through accountable institutions. 
Corporate tax is only one source of government revenue, though sometimes an 
important one, particularly for developing countries. While a global minimum tax 
may help small countries resist pressure to lower rates, they may also need to 
find alternative ways to attract investment.
At a time when multilateral cooperation in trade is faltering, momentum for 
international corporate tax reform is promising. However, fundamental questions 
remain about the proper allocation of taxing rights between source and residence 
countries, the value of user participation in new business models, tax sovereignty 
and industrial policy objectives. 
Clarity among all parties involved on what ongoing reforms are meant (and able) 
to deliver will help avoid frustrations over unmet expectations and highlight where 
further work is needed for tax systems to meet society’s expectations.
This paper is a product of the World Economic Forum’s Platform for Shaping the 
Future of Trade and Global Economic Interdependence.
Sean Doherty
Head of International Trade 
and Investment, Member of 
the Executive Committee, 
World Economic Forum
Aditi Sara Verghese
Policy Analyst, International 
Trade and Investment, World 
Economic Forum
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Corporate tax challenges in a 
globalized, digitalized economy
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play an important role in 
international trade and investment. They account for half of 
world exports, almost one-third of global production and 
one-quarter of employment.1 Economic liberalization and 
advancements in transport and communications have led 
to the proliferation of global value chains. Digitalization has 
enabled new business models. Intangible assets (trademarks, 
patents and other forms of knowledge-based capital) and 
(digital) services have become more important.
However, the rules that govern how countries tax the profits 
of MNEs are largely based on principles established in the 
early 20th century under the auspices of the League of 
Nations. Since the late 19th century, countries have entered 
into double taxation agreements to ensure that MNEs are 
not being taxed more than once on the same income for 
the same period by different taxing authorities. Certain 
fundamental principles underlying these rules are being 
called into question on the grounds that they are still tailored 
to a physical, less globalized economy and give rise to the 
following challenges. 
Remote business models
General tax principles, as enshrined under domestic 
and treaty law, provide that a source country can only 
tax business profits of foreign enterprises attributable 
to a “permanent establishment” through which the 
enterprise carries on business in the country. A permanent 
establishment is generally considered to be a fixed place of 
business, such as a branch, office, factory, etc.2 
However, digitalization allows businesses to play an active 
role in the country’s economy without a physical permanent 
establishment. Digital businesses can achieve “scale without 
mass”,3 reaching users and customers in different countries 
without significant local presence, though there may be 
significant activity, research and development elsewhere. 
For instance, social network websites can use data and 
content generated (“produced”) by users and sell targeted 
advertisements to other businesses, all without establishing 
a physical office in the country. Digital stores can access 
customers in a country without hiring employees there. 
Traditional businesses can also interact with an economy 
through digital channels.
Data and user participation
One of the arguments in favour of reform is the idea that 
for highly digitalized businesses, the content and/or data 
generated by users contributes significantly to the value of the 
business, enabling the sale of targeted advertising products to 
other businesses, for example. This is sometimes contested 
on the grounds that raw data derived from user jurisdictions is 
worthless without analysis. Addressing this question involves 
distinguishing between real value creation by users and 
consumers (taxed through corporate tax) and mere sales in 
the jurisdiction (taxed through consumption taxes).
Heavy use of intangible assets
Highly digitalized businesses are also characterized by a 
heavy reliance on intangible assets. This raises challenges 
when determining how to allocate profits for tax purposes 
among companies of the same MNE group operating in 
different countries. The “arm’s length principle” (ALP) is 
used to determine how to value transactions between these 
companies. It sets the amount that related entities in the 
same MNE group charge each other (the “transfer price”) 
for inputs, finished products, the use of intellectual property 
rights, etc. as if they were independent from each other. 
To assign values to transactions between related entities in 
different jurisdictions, companies’ tax departments need to 
consult economic databases to find comparable prices from 
similar independent transactions. 
The ALP works as an anti-avoidance rule that aims to prevent 
price manipulation. However, where businesses make profits 
from unique and valuable intangibles such as databases, 
software and algorithms, as well as marketing activities 
involving brands and trademarks, often no comparable price 
can be found, making it difficult to apply the ALP. As a result, 
this principle may be manipulated in an economy where 
intangibles play an important role and where commerce 
is increasingly carried out digitally. This tension has given 
rise to disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities and 
is at the centre of current discontent with the rules. Some 
have advocated for replacement by less complex allocation 
mechanisms, such as formulary apportionment.
Tax competition among countries
Tax competition among countries is another source of 
tension. This involves lowering corporate tax rates or 
providing tax incentives for specific industries or activities 
as countries compete for mobile economic activities.4 This 
is evidenced by the proliferation of tax regimes that treat 
income derived from intellectual property in a preferential 
way5 and the general downward trend in corporate income 
tax rates as shown in Figure 1. It should be noted, however, 
that, lately, corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
have increased in many countries.6 Further, countries have a 
sovereign right to set their tax rates, and many use them as 
part of industrial policy. 
Remaining base erosion and profit-shifting issues
In 2013, news media around the world highlighted a steady 
decrease in contributions to public finances by some high-
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Box 1: BEPS 1.0
The initial BEPS Project did not address allocation of 
taxing rights among jurisdictions. Instead, it provided 
a set of 15 Actions: four minimum standards, 10 best 
practices for countries to implement individually and 
a Multilateral Instrument. The minimum standards 
are soft law and thus not legally binding, but there is 
an expectation that they will be implemented into the 
tax system of the countries participating in the BEPS 
Inclusive Framework. The Multilateral Instrument, in force 
since July 2018, was introduced to modify bilateral tax 
treaties accordingly.
The BEPS Project introduced Action 1 to address the 
tax challenges of the digital economy. BEPS Action 1, 
one of the best practices for countries to implement, 
called for “a realignment of taxation and relevant 
substance to restore the intended effects and benefits 
of international standards, which may not have kept 
pace with changing business models and technological 
developments”. This also included the allocation of 
taxing rights where there is not physical presence and 
the improvement of transfer pricing rules to put more 
“emphasis on value creation in highly integrated groups, 
tackling the use of intangibles, risks, capital and other 
high-risk transactions to shift profits”.9
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Source: OECD Corporate Tax Statistics Database, 2019
profile MNEs. This decrease was associated with the ability of 
sophisticated taxpayers to shift otherwise taxable income and 
transactions out of the tax base, in what the OECD labelled 
“base erosion and profit shifting” or BEPS. 
The concern is that some MNEs use complex arrangements 
to legally pay very low corporate income tax. For instance, 
within an MNE group, an entity established in a low tax 
jurisdiction might give loans to other companies in the group 
and receive interest payments in return or hold valuable 
patents and license them to other companies in the group 
for royalty fees. These have the effect of reducing the taxable 
income of those other companies, typically based in higher 
tax jurisdictions, and reducing the overall tax liability of the 
MNE. The result is less tax revenue for countries and a 
public perception that MNEs do not pay their fair share. The 
increasing importance in the digital economy of intangible 
assets, which tend to be more mobile, exacerbates the issue.
In 2013 the OECD/G20 launched the BEPS Project to 
coordinate international tax rules and tackle tax avoidance 
strategies that exploit gaps in the rules and artificially shift 
profits to low tax jurisdictions. Although difficult to calculate in 
practice, estimates of yearly tax revenue losses due to profit 
shifting range from $100 billion to $650 billion.8 A full impact 
assessment of the changes introduced through the BEPS 
process on these figures has yet to be conducted – partly 
since implementation is still under way in many countries. 
Despite progress to date (see Box 1), there are some 
concerns over remaining BEPS issues. 
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The opportunity for reform 
Public concern and political impetus
There is considerable political momentum behind 
international and domestic tax reform. This is a result of 
broader societal pressure to deliver meaningful reform if 
support for a globalized economy is to be maintained. In 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the austerity 
measures that followed, there was public outcry over 
high-profile instances of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
Politicians, particularly in Europe, made tax reform a 
prominent part of election campaigns. Public and consumer 
backlashes have also raised the issue as a priority in 
corporate boardrooms and among tax advisory firms.
The BEPS Project described above was an effort to tackle 
corporate tax structures that result in artificial profit shifting 
and to deal with highly digitalized business. Through the 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS, the OECD/G20 brings 
together (as of November 2019) 135 jurisdictions, including 
developing countries, to work towards implementation.10  
More recently, these countries are working towards 
new rules to tackle the fundamental tax challenges of 
digitalization. Economic analysis and impact assessments 
of the proposals are being conducted. The discussions are 
evolving quickly, with a deadline for reaching agreement on 
the outlines of a Unified Approach in early 2020 and the aim 
to deliver a final solution by the end of 2020. 
To adapt existing tax rules to the digital economy, the 
European Commission introduced two legislative proposals 
in March 2018: one long-term solution to reform corporate 
tax rules so that profits are registered and taxed where 
businesses have significant interaction with users through 
digital channels; and one interim solution to introduce a digital 
services tax applicable to certain digital activities that generate 
revenues in the EU. There is no consensus on these two 
proposals, so the European Council presidency continues 
to work on the EU position in international discussions on 
digital tax.11  Meanwhile, a digital services tax was introduced 
in France (3% tax on revenues from digital services) and has 
been proposed in Spain, Austria and other countries.
Other unilateral measures include the equalization levy 
in India (6% tax on business-to-business transactions in 
the digital advertising space) and the diverted profit tax in 
Australia and the United Kingdom. The diverted profit tax 
aims to tackle corporate tax structures used by MNEs to 
avoid paying taxes in a specific country by shifting the profit 
to another country with a lower tax rate.
In the midst of these initiatives, businesses seek certainty, 
simplicity and coherence in tax rules and, to that end,  
many MNEs welcome international cooperation over  
unilateral action.
Venues for discussion
The OECD has become the primary venue for 
intergovernmental discussion on international tax reform. 
Additionally, other organizational structures that facilitate 
cooperation among developed and developing countries 
have been established or revitalized in recent years, 
allowing more consistent dialogue among policy-makers 
throughout the world. An unprecedented number of 
jurisdictions have been brought together through the 
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS. Other fora, 
such as the Network of Tax Organizations, the Platform 
for Collaboration on Tax (the International Monetary Fund, 
the OECD, the United Nations and the World Bank), the 
International Tax Compact and the UN Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (“UN 
Tax Committee”) have emerged or been strengthened. 
Such enhanced communication increases the likelihood of 
real agreement among countries.
The UN Subcommittee on Tax Challenges Related to the 
Digitalization of the Economy (“UN Subcommittee”) was 
created in 2017 to consider the interests of developing 
countries in particular. In January 2019, noting the 
developments at the OECD as well as unilateral measures 
taken by some countries, the subcommittee decided to 
undertake work on suggesting measures to tackle the 
tax challenges raised by digitalization of the economy. 
The goals are to avoid double taxation and double non-
taxation, encourage taxation of income on a net basis and 
seek simplicity and ease of administration. Accordingly, 
changes to the UN Model Tax Convention may be 
suggested, reflecting new nexus and profit allocation rules. 
However, as of November 2019, no definitive proposals 
have been released.
With public mobilization, political will and the expertise 
and capacity of international organizations, conditions for 
significant reform of the international tax system have rarely 
been as favourable as they are currently. Various proposals 
have been presented by international organizations,12 civil 
society and researchers. The next section examines the 
proposals being discussed currently at the multilateral, 
intergovernmental level in the area of corporate tax reform. 
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Proposals for reform 
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework proposals 
In addition to the implementation of the BEPS actions, 
countries in the Inclusive Framework are working towards 
agreement on a “consensus solution” to address two  
main concerns. 
The first concern is that current rules that require physical 
presence to create a “nexus” between the taxing jurisdiction 
and the firm operating there need to be updated for a 
digitalized economy. “Revised nexus and profit allocation 
rules” (Pillar 1) seek to address this issue. The proposal 
will have the effect of redistributing taxing rights among 
countries towards market jurisdictions by creating a “new 
taxing right”. However, the extent of this shift will depend on 
the form of the final proposal.
The second concern is that, despite the progress made so 
far through the BEPS Project, there are still ways for firms to 
avoid corporate tax by shifting their profits to low or no-tax 
jurisdictions – and that jurisdictions are able to effectively 
offer such low tax rates with the purpose of attracting 
business. This is intended to be addressed through the 
“global anti-base erosion proposal” (Pillar 2), which would 
introduce a global minimum tax system. 
Figure 2: Pillar 1: An illustration of the situation before and after the adoption of revised nexus and profit allocation rules13 
Source: World Economic Forum, adapted from G7 France, 2019.
Figure 3: Pillar 2: An illustration of the situation before and after the adoption of the global anti-base erosion proposal14 
Source: World Economic Forum, adapted from G7 France, 2019.
(1) Before: Countries cannot tax foreign 
companies in the absence of 
physical presence in the territory, 
even though digitalization allows 
them to operate there.
(2) After: Companies with a sustained 
and significant involvement with the 
economy will be subject to 
corporate tax and a portion of their 
profits allocated there. 
(1) Before: The parent company 
(located in high tax country) has 
subsidiaries carrying out operations 
(or holding intellectual property) in 
low tax countries to optimize the 
group’s global corporate tax bill. 
(2) After: Tax authorities in high tax 
country can determine that income 
generated by subsidiaries is being 
taxed below the minimum rate and 
tax the difference.
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The two pillars are discussed in more detail below. 
Pillar 1: Revised nexus and profit allocation rules 
Under Pillar 1, there are four technical aspects that need to 
be determined:
1.   Scope: defining which business models are covered
2.   New nexus rules: defining the basis of the connection 
between the taxing jurisdiction and the taxpayer that gives 
rise to the new taxing right, regardless of physical presence
3.   New profit allocation rules: determining the amount 
of profits that are subject to the new taxing right and 
how those profits should be allocated among different 
market jurisdictions
4.   Implementation arrangements: considering issues about 
the implementation and administration of the new taxing 
right, including measures to avoid double taxation, 
arrangements for dispute settlement and coordinated 
risk assessments.15 
At the beginning of 2019, three alternative proposals on 
these issues were considered: one by the United Kingdom 
(“user participation”), one by the United States (“marketing 
intangibles”) and one by the Group of 24, led by India and 
Colombia (“significant economic presence”).16 These were 
discussed in a public consultation process. Based on these 
original proposals and contributions from the public, the 
OECD developed a Programme of Work released in May 
2019 containing three distinct technical proposals to allocate 
profits: the modified residual profit split method, the fractional 
apportionment method and distribution-based approaches. 
In October 2019, the OECD Secretariat released a new 
document for public consultation, in which a new “Unified 
Approach” was presented. This new proposal is based on 
considerations about which elements of the three proposals 
would most likely lead to a consensus among member 
states of the Inclusive Framework.17 The main elements of 
these proposals are presented below. 
1. Scope
The Secretariat’s Unified Approach covers highly digitalized 
businesses, as well as consumer-facing businesses 
“that market their products to consumers and may use 
digital technology to develop a consumer base”.18 Certain 
industries (such as extractives, commodities and financial 
services) may be carved out and a revenue threshold may 
be introduced so smaller businesses are excluded. 
2. New nexus rules 
New nexus rules that capture the concept of remote taxable 
presence are being developed. A set of standards or 
indicators to determine when a business is said to have a 
remote taxable presence in a jurisdiction is also required. This 
may include a measure capturing sustained local revenues, 
along with other indicators which show that the MNE’s 
interaction with the economy goes beyond just selling.
In its Unified Approach, the Secretariat proposes that 
the new nexus rule cover “cases where a business has a 
sustained and significant involvement in the economy of a 
market jurisdiction, such as through consumer interaction 
and engagement, irrespective of its level of physical 
presence in that jurisdiction”.19 A revenue threshold may 
be determined for the market, based on its size, above 
which there is deemed to be a sustained and significant 
involvement. It is suggested that this take the form of a self-
standing treaty provision, as opposed to a broadening of the 
definition of “permanent establishment”. 
3. New profit allocation rules
New profit allocation rules are likely to involve separating 
the profits of an MNE into a portion that would be allocable 
following the current transfer pricing rules and a portion 
on which new rules would be applied that allow “market 
jurisdictions” to tax this part of the profits regardless of 
physical presence – if the business meets the nexus 
requirements above. 
This creates a system in which the current transfer pricing 
rules are still applied where the system supposedly works 
well and new rules apply where the case-by-case transfer 
pricing analysis does not produce results considered as 
adequate. To this latter part, a simplified distribution of the 
tax base relying on a formula negotiated between countries 
would be applied. What exact portion of profits will be 
allocated to each part still needs to be settled politically. 
Three alternative proposals to change profit allocation rules 
were published in the Programme of Work of May 2019:
A.   Modified residual profit split method (MRPS)
The MRPS method allocates a portion of the non-routine 
profits of an MNE group to market jurisdictions according 
to an allocation key. The first step is to determine the total 
profits of the MNE group and then differentiate its routine 
profits from its non-routine profits. Routine profit refers to a 
basic return appropriate for the type of transactions in which 
the business is engaged. Any profit above that level would 
be considered to be “non-routine” or “residual”. It would, 
in particular, cover unique and valuable intangible assets, 
for which no comparator can be found. Then, the portion 
of non-routine profits to be allocated to market jurisdictions 
under the new taxing right needs to be determined. Finally, 
that portion must be allocated between the different market 
jurisdictions according to an “allocation key”. For instance, 
the allocation may be based on revenue. 
B.   Fractional apportionment method
In this method, total profits are not separated into routine 
and non-routine profits. Instead, the overall profits of an 
MNE group (or business line)20 are considered. This method 
involves the following steps:
a.   Compute the profit to be divided: This may be done, for 
instance, by starting with the profit of the selling entity 
using current transfer pricing rules or by applying a global 
profit margin to local sales. 
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b.   Apply the allocation key/formula to apportion the profit to 
the relevant market jurisdiction(s): Factors considered in 
constructing the formula may include employees, assets, 
sales and users.
It would be necessary to address the interaction between 
current transfer pricing rules with the rules that implement 
the fractional apportionment method to avoid double 
taxation and double non-taxation. Rules are needed to 
determine how the new tax burden will be borne by the 
different entities of the MNE. 
C.  Distribution-based approaches
The BEPS Inclusive Framework is also considering the 
possibility of a simplified approach that pursues the aims of 
allocating more profit to market jurisdictions and reducing 
controversies concerning the proper pricing of marketing 
and distribution activities. One possible approach is to 
develop rules that determine a baseline amount of profit 
attributable to marketing, distribution and user-related 
activities in the market jurisdiction. This baseline profit may 
be increased or decreased, taking into account the MNE 
group’s overall profitability and/or additional variables such 
as industry and market differences to allocate a proportion 
of routine and non-routine profits to market jurisdictions.
OECD Secretariat’s Unified Approach
The Secretariat’s “Unified Approach”, released on 9 October 
2019, takes elements from all three proposals mentioned 
above and suggests a three-tiered approach to calculate 
income attributable to market jurisdictions. Three different 
amounts are calculated using different rules, and mandatory 
binding arbitration is included as a procedural element to 
avoid overlaps between the tiers and the potentially resulting 
double taxation.
Amount A: To calculate the first amount (or first part of the 
tax base), profits would be separated into a routine and a 
residual part. A fixed percentage of the residual part of the 
profits would then be allocated to the market jurisdictions 
based on the amount of sales made in that jurisdiction (see 
the explanation of the residual profit split above). This rule 
would apply regardless of whether or not the company has 
a physical presence in the jurisdiction. As a simplification 
measure, a fixed (“deemed”) percentage of the profits would 
be used to undertake the split, instead of a case-by-case 
analysis. The two fixed percentages to be defined have 
important implications for the impact of the proposal (the 
higher the amount of routine profits, the lower the impact; 
the higher the fraction of residual profits to be allocated, 
the higher the impact) and would therefore be subject to 
political debate.
Amount B: The routine profits would still be allocated using 
the current transfer pricing system – with the exception 
of the second amount. This second amount would be a 
part of the routine profits, calculated by applying a fixed 
return (or profitability) to entities of the multinational group 
that undertake marketing and distribution activities within 
a market jurisdiction (see in essence the explanation of the 
distribution-based approach above). The reason why this 
part of the routine profits would be taken out of the current 
transfer pricing system is that many disputes between 
taxpayers and tax authorities arise when it comes to 
determining the proper remuneration for these marketing 
and distribution functions. Importantly, this second amount 
can be attributed only to jurisdictions where the multinational 
group has a physical presence.
Amount C: Finally, a tax administration or a taxpayer might 
argue that more profits than fixed by the second amount 
should be attributed to the marketing and distribution 
function mentioned above or that the company performs 
other business activities in the jurisdiction, apart from 
marketing and distribution. Hence, a third amount, 
supported by a proper justification, could be added. 
Since the determination of this third amount could easily 
lead to dispute, the OECD Secretariat proposes including 
mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms. 
4. Implementation
Once the new nexus and allocation rules have been 
introduced, rules will be needed to ensure efficient 
implementation and administration of the new taxing right 
by developed and developing countries. The Inclusive 
Framework anticipates that the following issues will need to 
be addressed:
 – Whether existing double taxation relief mechanisms  
and dispute resolution systems are sufficient 
 – How to coordinate the application of the new taxing  
right with other taxing rights, such as withholding taxes  
 – How to enable the tax authority to enforce and collect 
the tax where the entity liable to pay it is not resident  
in the taxing jurisdiction 
 – How to ensure the data needed to implement the  
new taxing right is available to tax administrations  
and taxpayers 
 – How to establish and report on where final sales  
and services are deemed to have taken place or  
been delivered.  
A peer review process may be needed to ensure consistent 
implementation, along with a second Multilateral Instrument 
to update existing treaties.
Pillar 2: Global anti-base erosion (GloBE) proposal
Under Pillar 2, the Inclusive Framework considers rules to 
prevent global undertaxation of corporate profits and thereby 
builds on the initial BEPS Project. These were proposed by 
Germany and France and based on similar rules introduced 
through US tax reform in 2017.21 The proposals comprise a 
combination of the four rules listed below:
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Residence
Source
Underlying these rules will be an effective tax-rate test, 
which could be carried out at either entity, jurisdiction or 
global level. Conducting such a test at the global level, for 
example, would mean that the overall effective tax rate of 
the whole corporate group would be calculated and, if it falls 
short of a predetermined rate, a jurisdiction would have the 
right to impose additional tax up to that (minimum) level.
Fundamental questions remain, such as how high the 
minimum tax should be and whether the source jurisdiction 
or the residence jurisdiction would have the right to apply 
their respective rule first (to increase the company’s 
effective tax rate, in case the company is undertaxed). An 
important political question is the level at which the test 
should be applied – worldwide, jurisdiction or entity level. 
The lower the level, the bigger the impact of the minimum 
tax at a given rate. 
Another issue is determining exceptions and carve-outs. 
Proposed ideas include a carve-out for tax incentives 
related to research and development (to ensure continuity of 
preferential regimes for intellectual property),23 an exception 
for income that has economic substance in a jurisdiction 
or limiting minimum taxation profits above a normal rate of 
return. An additional important concern is the definition of 
the multinational group. What participation threshold should 
trigger “belonging to a group”? Political debate about these 
is likely to influence the ultimate outcome on the global 
minimum tax approach.
Figure 4: Summary of rules making up the GloBE proposal












Subject to tax rule
Inclusion rule
Tax on base-eroding 
payments
Apply a minimum tax to help prevent tax 
competition among countries.
For jurisdictions committed through their tax 
treaties to exempt foreign earned income, 
introduce an additional rule that would allow 
applying the credit method (instead of the 
exemption method) in case the foreign income 
is taxed at a rate lower than the minimum rate.22 
Deny deduction or impose a tax (including 
withholding tax) for payments made to a 
related party in another jurisdiction, if payment 
was not subject to the minimum tax.
Grant certain benefits only if the particular 
income was taxed at the minimum rate or above.
Foreign profits from a foreign company or 
permanent establishment that belongs to the 
same group as a resident company would 
be included in the company’s tax base if they 
have been taxed only at a low rate. (Top-up to 
ensure minimum tax is paid.) 
Protect the source jurisdiction from base-
eroding payments.
With regards to the impact on developing countries, there 
are two considerations. On the one hand, if a developing 
country taxes income at a low rate due to a preferential 
regime or other rules, the residence country of the MNE 
(generally a developed country) would tax the income 
instead, up to the minimum rate. A minimum tax thus 
reduces the ability of a developing country to compete for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) through low tax rates and, 
in addition, the profits realized in source countries would 
be taxed by the residence country. On the other hand, if 
developing countries actually wish to adopt higher taxes but 
are prevented from doing so because of tax competition, a 
minimum tax would effectively enable them to do so. Finally, 
the hierarchy of rules mentioned above might have particular 
implications for developing countries, since it would 
determine whether source countries (which most developing 
countries are, to a great extent) or residence countries have 
priority in applying a minimum tax. Generally, if the source 
rule (tax on base-eroding payments) becomes the primary 
rule, and income inclusion only the secondary rule, this 
would be more beneficial for most developing countries, 
being capital importing countries.
In November 2019, the OECD Secretariat published a 
consultation document seeking input from stakeholders on 
technical issues regarding the GloBE proposal; for example, 
whether financial statements can be used to undertake 
the effective tax-rate test and what carve-outs might be 
appropriate. It also asked for responses on the potential 
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compliance effects of the different possible policy choices, 
such as the question of the level at which the effective tax-
rate test should take place, while leaving the final decision 
on the level and the actual minimum tax rate open for 
political discussion in 2020.24 
UN Subcommittee
The UN Subcommittee highlights concerns regarding the 
value creation-based models discussed under Pillar 1. Such 
proposals might potentially result in reallocating taxing rights 
from the supply side, which focuses on production and 
marketing, to the demand side, where the primary focus 
is on price, profits and the paying capacity of consumers. 
While both demand- and supply-side factors create market 
value, under currently applicable rules, corporate taxation 
is primarily allocated to supply-side factors contributing to 
profitability, whereas other indirect taxes such as VAT, excise 
and sales tax are allocated to demand-side factors, based 
on consumption.25
User-based proposals may shift this existing balance to 
the detriment of smaller developing economies with limited 
domestic markets and a greater reliance on exports. 
Therefore, rules should be determined based on multiple 
factors from both the demand and supply side and not merely 
demand-side considerations. The “significant economic 
proposal” put forward by G24 countries does examine this to 
an extent by considering factors beyond sale, such as assets 
and employees. One factor that is currently usually overlooked 
is “location savings” – that is, consideration of lower labour 
and real estate costs in some countries. 
The UN Subcommittee also highlights the complexities of 
the OECD’s MRPS and fractional apportionment proposals. 
The MRPS method is complex in theory with respect to 
determining routine and non-routine profits, whereas the 
fractional apportionment method would be difficult to 
implement in practice as it would require consensus among 
all countries on a common tax base, allocation factors and 
joint auditing and dispute resolution responsibilities.
Therefore, the UN Subcommittee is considering solutions 
that are easy for taxpayers to comply with and for 
developing-country authorities to administer, while 
acknowledging that such solutions will probably involve 
trade-offs with respect to accuracy, allocation between 
countries and identifying applicable businesses.
The amendment of Article 5 of the UN Model Tax 
Convention – the provision defining permanent 
establishment – is being considered, along with the addition 
of Article 12B – a new rule to enable source taxation of 
digital services, on the lines of taxation of passive income 
(for example, royalties, interest, dividends). Withholding 
taxes are also being explored as mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with any new or revised taxation rules. However, 
as of November 2019, no firm proposals have been shared. 
13Corporate Tax, Digitalization and Globalization
Stakeholder perspectives 
This section provides examples of positions and actions 
that different stakeholders have taken on these issues. 
Despite several differences, there are points of convergence 
among stakeholders. Most see the need for transparency 
and simplicity in any new rules to minimize the costs and 
inefficiencies concerning compliance and administration for 
taxpayers and tax authorities.
Governments 
With corporate taxation, governments attempt to strike a 
balance between two main objectives: (1) raising tax revenue 
from capital income to finance public expenditures or to 
redistribute income; and (2) using tax incentives to attract 
investment in their economies, which may also lead to other 
sources of tax revenue. How these objectives are weighted 
depends on the country’s economic structure (size and other 
factors that influence investment decisions) and political 
factors (such as preferences of voters, power of other 
political actors). Differences between countries along these 
lines make reaching international agreement challenging.
In a system in which many countries have agreed that 
one unit of income of an MNE should be taxed only once, 
countries have varying preferences as to how the income 
should be distributed. Countries with large markets, such 
as most G7 countries, may prefer to have the location of 
sales play an important role in the distribution. Developing 
countries with many factories with low value-added activities 
and smaller markets, may prefer to have the distribution of 
the number of employees within an MNE determine how 
profits are allocated.26 Some countries with high value-added 
activities and many headquarters, especially of companies 
affected under Pillar 1, may prefer more limited changes. 
For instance, Switzerland has argued along these lines.27 
Smaller developing countries and the UN Subcommittee 
challenge the validity of the value creation principle as a 
basis for taxing rights. Many governments work through and 
with international and regional organizations to develop and 
express their positions (see Box 2).
From KPMG’s multistakeholder roundtables, it 
is clear there are different drivers for change: 
the outdated global tax accord due to modern 
business models; a desire to change the 
current split of taxing rights between countries; 
concerns about avoidance; complexity; 
perceptions of fairness; quasi-monopolies. 
Clarity is needed on which of these issues any 
solution is designed to address. 
Chris Morgan, Head of Global Tax Policy,  
KPMG International
Box 2: International and regional organizations 
The OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration 
organizes meetings of the BEPS Inclusive Framework 
and of the policy-oriented working parties in which 
representatives of member states take part. It drafts 
technical reports that serve as a basis for reaching 
agreement and undertakes economic impact 
assessments. 
The IMF provides reports and economic analysis of tax 
policies, gives technical advice to 100 members and 
covers international tax issues in its surveillance work. It 
engages in important debates on reforms broader than 
those discussed within the OECD Inclusive Framework; 
for instance, in its 2019 report Corporate Taxation in the 
Global Economy.28 The IMF research has led to growing 
interest in destination-based approaches, such as 
Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation.29
The UN Tax Committee strives to include developing 
countries in the debates on international tax and 
develops alternative standards to those developed in 
the working parties of the OECD, such as the UN Model 
Tax Convention and the UN Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
In addition to the participation in the Platform for 
Collaboration on Tax created in 2016 to intensify 
cooperation and to support developing countries, the 
IMF, the World Bank and the UN also provide technical 
assistance and advice to member countries.
The G24 is an international organization of developing 
countries that attempts to coordinate their positions on 
issues of international economic policy.30 It has brought 
countries together to put forward one specific proposal 
on the allocation of taxing rights, the “significant 
economic presence” proposal.31
The EU Commission strives for harmonization of tax policy 
at the EU level and promotes “good tax governance” 
(transparency, exchange of information and fair taxation) 
through its trade and investment agreements.
Regional tax organizations such as the Inter-American 
Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT),32 the African 
Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and the Cercle 
de Reflexion et D’Échange des Dirigeants des 
Administrations Fiscales (CREDAF) play a role in 
knowledge dissemination and the formation of policy 
positions among their member countries. ATAF, for 
example, released several technical notes on the 
discussions carried out at the Inclusive Framework, 
expressing clear policy preferences.33
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ATAF is working for a fairer allocation of 
taxing rights and to stem the erosion of 
African tax bases due to profit shifting. 
Regarding digitalization, new taxing rights 
for market jurisdictions would address the 
existing imbalance between source and 
residence jurisdictions. A minimum rate of 
taxation for MNEs, if properly designed and 
implemented, would address base-eroding 
payments and illicit financial flows out of Africa. 
ATAF advocates for African policy-makers’ 
involvement in this process 
We at IBM believe that global tax changes 
should target areas where current rules come 
up short – we think the long-standing arm’s 
length principle should remain the point of 
departure. The OECD is the appropriate  
forum for compromise solutions that target 
abuse and avoid adverse effects on foreign 
direct investment.
Tax abuse by multinational companies costs 
$500 billion annually. Lower-income countries 
lose the largest share of their revenues. The 
OECD reforms have, valuably, gone beyond the 
obsolete arm’s length principle, normalizing 
unitary and formulary approaches. But the 
present proposal redistributes little profit from 
tax havens, and barely anything to lower-
income countries.
The African Tax Administration Forum Secretariat, 
Pretoria, South Africa
Linda Evans, Director, Global Tax Policy and 
Government Affairs, IBM
Alex Cobham, Chief Executive, Tax Justice Network
Businesses
The most common request from MNEs is for a principle-
based, multilateral solution that provides certainty, fairness 
and coherence and is simple to comply with.34 Tax certainty 
implies that the tax burden a company will face when 
carrying out certain investments and transactions can be 
calculated in advance with a minimal degree of uncertainty 
as to whether or not the involved tax administration(s) will 
agree with the calculation. The issue of certainty is distinct 
from the issue of the overall level of taxation.35
Additionally, MNEs emphasize the need to avoid double 
taxation and argue for the worldwide establishment of 
mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes over the allocation 
of taxing rights between countries. Start-ups that are born 
global, due to their digital business models, face concerns 
about compliance if rules are complicated. 
Many businesses have engaged constructively in the 
OECD’s public consultation, with proposals submitted by 
Uber, Johnson & Johnson and others.36
Some companies have made use of aggressive tax planning 
techniques, but not all. A number of them voluntarily 
publish more information than legally required or adopt 
explicit strategies to refrain from aggressive tax planning.37 
Due to the growth of the responsible business movement, 
more and more businesses are concerned with broader 
issues such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and have an interest in supporting them through 
their contribution to public budgets.38 Businesses profit 
from a general environment of trust among stakeholders.39 
To address these concerns, various initiatives have been 
created by businesses40 and tax advisory firms to engage 
stakeholders,41 promote sustainable business,42 enhance 
transparency and build trust and reputation.43
Civil society organizations and academics
NGOs and trade unions44 emphasize the importance of 
greater transparency on the part of both companies and 
governments towards the public; for example, through 
public country-by-country reporting. They also stress the 
need to raise more tax revenue from corporate income 
globally to reach the SDGs, safeguard economic human 
rights and tackle inequality; and they propose allocating a 
higher share of taxing rights to developing countries. They 
further argue that aggressive tax planning by companies and 
tax advisers is unacceptable. Where this entails “aggressive 
social planning”, there is a negative impact on employment 
and workers’ rights. Tax Justice Network and many trade 
unions have therefore favoured a unitary taxation approach.45 
With regards to the GloBE proposal, civil society 
organizations have argued for setting the global minimum 
tax rate close to the current average statutory tax rate and 
raised concerns that a minimum tax rate set at a low level 
might create a downward trend in countries that currently 
apply higher tax rates.46
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Because of current tax rules, multinationals 
adopt complex corporate structures to shift 
profits around. This fails fair taxation; it also 
has a dire impact on workers. Aggressive tax 
planning entails aggressive social planning, 
undermining employment responsibilities 
and the financial health of normally profitable 
companies. Trade unions call for more  
unitary taxation.
Séverine Picard, Senior Policy Adviser, Trade Union 
Advisory Committee (TUAC)
Some academics have criticized the fast pace of the 
BEPS Project and argued that it created deficits in input 
legitimacy (lack of participation in the agenda setting) and 
output legitimacy (the search for collective solutions and the 
mechanisms to achieve these solutions) vis-à-vis developing 
countries.47 Some issues arising from the implementation 
of the BEPS Project for developing countries include 
increased complexity in tax legislation and the diversion 
of resources from other challenges, such as tackling the 
informal economy, preventing corruption, improving taxpayer 
services and tax collection. 
With respect to the GloBE proposal, some have expressed 
that an international effective minimum tax “still permits 
countries to vie for foreign investments through low levels 
of effective taxation but establishes a lower floor for this 
competition and thereby protects high-tax countries from 
having to completely abandon their own, diverging tax policy 
preferences”.48
The proposed minimum tax raises several questions in 
global tax governance, as developing countries will have 
to reconsider their tax incentives. What will developing 
countries get in return? How will they attract the FDI 
necessary to achieve economic growth and reach the 
SDGs?49 In particular, “minimum taxation of affiliates in LDCs 
could be limited to profits that exceed a normal return on 
eventual investments in this country (similar to the current 
US tax on GILTI)”.50
Developing country and civil society organization 
respondents to an IMF consultation highlighted the following 
flaws of the BEPS Project: (1) the continued reliance on 
the ALP, seen as complex, unsuited to modern economic 
realities and based on the fiction of separate entities; and (2) 
the lack of balance in source and residence taxation, seen 
as unresponsive to developing-country needs.51
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Broader considerations
In these discussions and in designing tax policy, 
governments must consider several factors. The first is 
the incidence of the tax – that is, who actually bears the 
economic burden of the tax (as opposed to who makes the 
payment to the tax administration). If a country increases its 
corporate tax rate, one or a combination of several things 
can happen. 
1.   The after-tax profits of a given company are reduced, the 
company distributes lower dividends and shareholders 
are economically affected by the increase.
2   The company pays its workers or suppliers less to keep 
the same level of dividends, and the incidence lies on 
workers and suppliers.
3.   The company increases the prices of its goods to 
maintain the level of profits, and the burden is passed on 
to customers.
Empirically, the incidence of corporate taxation is an 
important issue in tax policy debates.52 The economic 
burden might vary significantly between sectors, depending 
on consumer and labour market structures, as well as on 
institutions that influence those markets (competition law, 
trade law, labour law, etc.).
The second is the tax mix – that is, the relative importance 
of different sources of government revenue. Relevant 
considerations are the incidence, administrability and 
efficiency of different taxes. Corporate taxation plays an 
important role in the tax mix of developing countries, since it 
is comparatively easy to levy and administer (see Figure 5). 
However, other taxes are quantitatively more significant in 
many countries.
Third, tax competition is only one form of “territorial 
competition”. To avoid a shift to a race-to-the-bottom in other 
areas, it is necessary to consider international cooperation 
in tax matters in conjunction with cooperation in other areas, 
such as labour, environmental and climate policy.
Fourth, taxation is only one side of public finance. A high level 
of transfers to the government is beneficial if the resources 
are spent and redistributed in a responsible way. This 
depends on the existence of accountable institutions and 
processes that determine how revenues should be allocated. 
Finally, the tax challenges of digitalization extend beyond 
the currently debated issues of allocation of income. Any 
future replacement of human labour by artificial intelligence, 
the growth of the “gig economy” and the ensuing levels 
of unemployment might necessitate far greater levels of 
redistribution than currently carried out through tax systems. 
Some experts have proposed taxing robots or artificial 
intelligence as part of the solution.54 Others have emphasized 
the importance of reskilling the workforce.
These considerations should not, however, be seen as 
arguments against measures that potentially increase the 
corporate tax revenue available to governments. They should 
merely remind us that taxation is one important institution 
that is and can only be part of a larger environment, in which 
the quality of one institution affects the quality of others. 
Figure 5: Revenue from corporate income tax as a percentage of total tax revenue (1990–2017)53
Source: IMF World Revenue Longitudinal Data (WoRLD).
Note: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Income Groups; and excluding resource-rich countries. 
Note to Editor: 
Figures are low-res as they have been 
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The way forward 
Discussions on the reform of international tax rules advance 
at a pace possibly never witnessed before. Nevertheless, 
the exact nature and direction of the changes are still 
uncertain and will be subject to political negotiation. 
Whether a stable consensus on a harmonized way to tax 
income from digital business will emerge in 2020 is still 
uncertain, and there are developments pointing in the 
opposite direction. For example, the number of countries 
that have proposed or have already introduced a digital 
service tax is rising. 
A consensus-based solution with the active and meaningful 
engagement of all governments and stakeholders can 
contribute to the long-term stability of the international 
tax system. At the same time, the material implications of 
changes are still under-researched. If consensus is reached, 
the solution will shape the international tax landscape for 
many years to come. It would therefore be wise to dedicate 
more resources to investigating the implications. 
Such assessments should take into account the effects 
on overall tax revenue generation and tax competition, 
but also global investment, trade and innovation. They 
should evaluate how changes to global tax rules affect the 
distribution of economic resources between countries, 
how they affect employment and public resource provision 
within countries and the feasibility of reporting requirements, 
implementation, administration and enforcement. In that 
sense, given that the aims are to be global and inclusive, 
solutions must be practicable for tax administrations 
with few resources, such as those one may encounter in 
developing countries. 
Globalization signifies a drastic intensification of relations 
among countries and between the individuals inhabiting 
them. Attempts to regulate these relations should aim for 
fairness and equity and pay particular attention to the least 
favoured, embodying the spirit of the SDGs. 
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Appendices
Timeline of events
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework: Timeline of events
2013
OECD/G20 BEPS Project launched
Established to create international framework to tackle tax 
avoidance.
5 October 2015
BEPS Action 1 report Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy, released (as part of the 15 Action Plan, called 
“BEPS Package”)
Identified tax challenges relating distinctly to digitalization – 
nexus, data and characterization.
April 2016
Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) launched by the 
IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank
Designed to intensify cooperation between the four 
organizations on international tax. 
2016
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS established
Involves developing economies in the implementation, 
review and monitoring of the BEPS Package.
March 2017
G20 finance ministers’ mandate to the Inclusive 
Framework (working through the Task Force on the 
Digital Economy or TFDE)
Tasked to work on implications of digitalization for taxation. 
Commitment to deliver interim report in 2018 and final report 
in 2020.
16 March 2018
OECD interim report, Tax Challenges Arising from 
Digitalisation, released following mandate from G20
Analysis of value creation through digital business models 
and related tax challenges. 
February 2019
OECD public consultation document released seeking 
comments on proposals
Outlines three alternative proposals being considered 
under Pillar 1: revised profit allocation and nexus rules 
(user participation; marketing intangibles; and significant 
economic presence proposals) and Pillar 2: global anti-base 
erosion proposal. 
13–14 March 2019
OECD Task Force on the Digital Economy holds public 
consultation meeting
Large response with many written submissions.
May 2019
OECD Inclusive Framework’s Programme of Work to 
Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges 
Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy released
Describes three alternative approaches for profit allocation 
(MRPS, fractional apportionment, and distribution-based 
approaches) and nexus rules under Pillar 1 and GloBE proposal 
under Pillar 2; sets out agenda for the work programme; 
endorsed by G20 finance ministers in June 2019.55 
9 October – 12 November 2019
OECD Secretariat proposal for a “Unified Approach” 
under Pillar 1 and public consultation
Combines different elements of earlier proposals, with scope 
restricted to consumer-facing businesses, nexus based 
on a sustained, significant involvement and a three-tier 
mechanism for profit allocation.
8 November – 2 December 2019 
OECD Secretariat document and public consultation  
on Pillar 2 
Seeks input on specific technical issues. 
UN Subcommittee: Timeline of events
2004 
UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation 
in Tax Matters (“UN Tax Committee”) established
Mandate to provide practical guidance for international tax 
cooperation, to prevent both double taxation and non-
taxation, and seeking simplicity and administrability.
20 October 2017
UN Subcommittee on Tax Challenges Related to the 
Digitalization of the Economy (“UN Subcommittee”) 
established under the UN Tax Committee
Primary focus on developing countries.
16–18 January 2019
UN Subcommittee Meeting decision to adopt approach 
independent of similar work in other fora
Work to propose guidance on (1) tax treaty issues; (2) 
domestic law issues; and (3) VAT issues.
5 April 2019
UN Subcommittee report Tax Issues Related to the 
Digitalization of the Economy released
Lists possible frameworks for changes to UN Model 
Convention and provides guidance on VAT and indirect  
tax issues.
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Glossary of terms
Arm’s length principle: an arm’s length transaction is one 
in which the parties to the transaction each act individually 
and in their own respective interests. The actual prices paid 
for goods, services or intangibles between related parties 
may vary from those paid in an arm’s length transaction. 
The arm’s length principle is an international standard that 
allows MNE groups and tax administrations to use, for 
tax purposes, an arm’s length price instead of the actual 
price paid between related parties. Profits that would have 
accrued to one of the parties had the transaction been at 
arm’s length are included, for tax purposes, in that party’s 
profits and taxed accordingly.56
Corporate income tax: tax on the income of companies, 
with the tax base being corporate profits.57
Market jurisdiction: jurisdiction in which users, customers 
or consumers of a business are located. 
Residence country: country in which an entity is liable to be 
taxed because of domicile, residence, place of management 
or another similar criterion, and not by reason of income or 
capital situated within the country. The domestic law of the 
residence country determines whether the entity is resident 
there for tax purposes.58
Routine and residual profits: under the profit split 
method, the combined profit from controlled transactions 
is divided into two stages. In the first stage, each party 
is allocated sufficient profit to provide it with a basic or 
normal return, determined based on returns achieved for 
similar transactions by independent parties under market 
conditions. These are considered routine profits. In the 
second stage, any residual profit is allocated among the 
parties based on an analysis of how this residual profit 
would have been divided between independent enterprises. 
These residual or non-routine profits may arise from 
intangibles, for instance.59
Source country: country in which a particular item of 
income is deemed to originate or be generated.60
Transfer price: price charged by a company for goods, 
services or intangible property to a subsidiary or other 
related company.61
Withholding tax: tax on income imposed at source, in 
which a third party (generally, the payer of the income) is 
required to deduct the tax from certain kinds of payments 
and remit it to the government. These taxes are commonly 
used in relation to dividends, interest, royalties and other 
similar payments.62
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